Mr. President, I would

like to address the Senate for a few

minutes about this very serious situation

unfolding in Kosovo.

Last fall I gave a series of remarks

regarding the increasing problems relating

to Kosovo. On September 3, 1998,

having just returned from Kosovo at

that time, and subsequently on October

2, October 8 and October 20, I stood at

this very desk and said it was my belief

that the types of atrocities that the

world has witnessed in the past few

days would quickly unfold, unless

NATO placed in the Pristina region a

ground force to serve as a deterrent.

That may not be a popular position,

but it is a realistic one, and I expressed

it to the Supreme Allied Commander of

NATO, General Clark, just a few days

ago. I reiterated the fact that we simply

had to put in place a deterrent

force.

Now, there is the complexity that

Kosovo is a sovereign part of Yugoslavia—

a sovereign nation. However, if

we are using the threat of air operations

against that sovereign country,

it seems to me that short of taking

that step, we could make it very clear

to Milosevic, who unquestionably is responsible

for these atrocities, that it is

absolutely essential to have this

ground force in place. Currently, over

800 individuals—unarmed verifiers—are

in Kosovo, trying to help the people of

this tragic region sort out their lives

and receive the basics of food and shelter.

Now, those people are at risk.

Mr. President, I also say that if that

NATO force were to be placed in the

Pristina region, as I so recommend, a

part of that force would have to be a

U.S. component. General Clark, Supreme

Allied Commander of NATO, is

an American officer. In my judgment,

we could not in clear conscience have a

NATO force in place without some representation

of American servicemen

and women. I recognize the risks, but

there is a direct parallel, Mr. President,

between the disintegration in

Kosovo, the threat of atrocities and,

indeed, conflict between the KLA and

the Serbian forces. Conflict, which in

the estimate of those on the scene, is

looming just weeks ahead. There is a

direct correlation between Kosovo and

Bosnia. Although I personally was initially

opposed to the deployment of

U.S. ground troops in Bosnia, once

done, I have been a strong supporter of

getting it done correctly. This Nation

has contributed a very significant investment,

first, of men and women in

the Armed Forces serving as an integral

part of the NATO forces in Bosnia,

and second, with respect to billions of

dollars of the taxpayers’ money.

In my judgment, there has been very

little progress of late in Bosnia because

of the political factions still tenaciously

holding on to their fractious relationships

between Serbs and Croats,

Muslims and Croats, and Muslims and

Serbs—all of the ethnic, deep-rooted

problems which brought about this

conflict many years ago. But we could

lose that investment; what little gain

has been achieved in Bosnia could be

lost and, indeed, in all probability, any

ability to advance toward an independent

nation—one that is militarily and

economically able to stand on its own

feet so that we can get our forces out,

together with other allies involved.

That is in jeopardy with this instability

in Kosovo because those various

factions are going to watch Kosovo and

say, ‘‘NATO is not going to do anything

there, so let’s just wait it out in

Bosnia. Wait it out, and we will have

that opportunity some day to go back

and fight amongst ourselves to achieve

our respective goals.’’

So, Mr. President, I so recommend to

our President and other leaders in

NATO today, other nations, examine

very carefully, indeed, the suggestion

to place a ground force as a deterrent

force in the Pristina region as quickly

as possible.

I yield the floor.